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Direct assessment of attitudes toward socially sensitive topics can be affected by
deception attempts. Reaction-time based indirect measures, such as the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), are less susceptible to such biases. Neuroscientific evidence
shows that deception can evoke characteristic ERP differences. However, the cerebral
processes involved in faking an IAT are still unknown. We randomly assigned 20
university students (15 females, 24.65 ± 3.50 years of age) to a counterbalanced
repeated-measurements design, requesting them to complete a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on
attitudes toward doping without deception instruction, and with the instruction to
fake positive and negative doping attitudes. Cerebral activity during BIAT completion
was assessed using high-density EEG. Event-related potentials during faking revealed
enhanced frontal and reduced occipital negativity, starting around 150ms after stimulus
presentation. Further, a decrease in the P300 and LPP components was observed.
Source analyses showed enhanced activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus between 150
and 200ms during faking, thought to reflect the suppression of automatic responses.
Further, more activity was found for faking in the bilateral middle occipital gyri and the
bilateral temporoparietal junction. Results indicate that faking reaction-time based tests
alter brain processes from early stages of processing and reveal the cortical sources of
the effects. Analyzing the EEG helps to uncover response patterns in indirect attitude
tests and broadens our understanding of the neural processes involved in such faking.
This knowledge might be useful for uncovering faking in socially sensitive contexts, where
attitudes are likely to be concealed.
Keywords: EEG/ERP, implicit association test (IAT), faking, deception, indirect tests, anti-doping, right inferior
frontal gyrus
Introduction
Attitudes are among the strongest social cognitive predictors of human behavior (Kraus, 1995).
Direct (i.e., self-report) assessment of socially sensitive attitudes can be distorted by social
desirability bias (McDaniel et al., 2009) because the purpose of a given test often is easy
to determine, and thus allows participants to deliberately choose and alter their responses
(Roehner et al., 2011). The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) constitutes
a class of reaction-time based indirect tests that aim to hide the true goal of measurement
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better than do direct tests. It is presented typically as a lexical
sorting task on a computer, where two concepts (one target and
one evaluative) are mapped on the same response key of the
keyboard. The task is easier and reaction times are faster when
the two concepts that share the same response key (e.g., flowers+
like) are closely associated, rather than when the they are not
associated (e.g., insects+ like).
IAT methods have evolved as one standard for indirect
attitude testing in social cognition research (Krosnick et al.,
2005). One of the IAT’s most important features is its postulated
potential to control for the social desirability bias by evading
voluntary control and being rather robust toward deception
attempts compared to direct tests (Kaempfe et al., 2009; Teige-
Mocigemba et al., 2010). Indeed, compared with questionnaires,
IATs display higher predictive validity when socially sensitive
constructs are measured (Greenwald et al., 2009). As a more
economic, but equally valid and reliable variant, Brief IATs
(BIAT) have received considerable scientific attention in the past
few years (Sriram and Greenwald, 2009).
Doping attitudes are among the strongest statistical predictors
of doping behavior (e.g., Mallia et al., 2013; Ntoumanis et al.,
2014). Doping in sports is a socially and legally sanctioned
behavior. Therefore, people with rather permissive doping
attitudes are often motivated to disguise their real attitude and
instead provide the socially desired response, namely that they
dislike doping (Gucciardi et al., 2010). Whereas, data from
doping attitude questionnaires is often skewed and of very
limited value for the prediction of doping behavior, the doping
BIAT (Brand et al., 2014a) has been found to be a valid predictor
for positive biochemical doping test results (Brand et al., 2014b).
Thus, in the present study, the behavioral and neural correlates of
faking the doping BIAT are examined.
In general, the IAT’s robustness toward faking has been heavily
studied as of late (Fiedler and Bluemke, 2005; De Houwer
et al., 2007; Cvencek et al., 2010; Roehner et al., 2013). We use
the terms faking and deception synonymously in this article
because the former is more common in the cited social cognition
research (e.g., Fiedler and Bluemke, 2005; De Houwer et al.,
2007), whereas the latter is more common in the neuroscientific
research we cite (e.g., Johnson et al., 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008;
Crites et al., 2010). So far, results have indicated that the IAT
can be deceived to some extent (e.g., Fiedler and Bluemke, 2005;
De Houwer et al., 2007). However, most participants need to be
instructed regarding a successful faking strategy. Kim (2003), for
example, showed that participants could not effectively conceal
their positive attitude toward flowers unless they were told how to
do so. Only after having been provided with the explicit strategy
to respond more slowly when the concepts flower and like were
mapped on the same response key did participants not reveal
their positive attitude. Recently, considerable research efforts
also have been devoted to autobiographical IAT (aIAT) faking.
Here, the truthfulness of a previously established autobiographic
memory is evaluated using reaction-time based IATmethodology
(for a review, see Agosta and Sartori, 2013). Regarding faking
the aIAT, response slowing likewise has been demonstrated as
an effective means to fake this test (Verschuere et al., 2009).
In addition, a recent study (Hu et al., 2012) has demonstrated
the possibility to fake the aIAT by speeding up responses in the
incongruent block. However, the aIAT differs from traditional
IAT variants in that it focuses on autobiographical memories (Hu
et al., 2012) and not on social cognitive predictors of behavior,
such as attitudes (Greenwald et al., 1998).
There are theoretical and practical reasons for why research on
IAT faking has become topical in the social cognition literature:
Evidence showing that IATs can be faked has challenged
the theoretical claim that IAT scores really reflect implicit
associations. These are theorized to represent output from the
impulsive system of the social information system (De Houwer
et al., 2009) and should therefore be immune to faking. From
a practical perspective, test-takers with high motivation to
disguise their true attitude will most likely begin to develop and
apply deception strategies. It is thus important to investigate
possibilities to detect fake test results (e.g., Cvencek et al., 2010)
and potential threats to test validity in general.
Extant studies only address overt behavioral consequences of
deception attempts on IAT variants (i.e., changes in reaction
times) or try to statistically detect faking (e.g., Agosta et al., 2010;
Cvencek et al., 2010), but do not consider cerebral mechanisms.
Whereas, no research has yet addressed the involved cerebral
correlates of IAT deception, a few studies have addressed the
cerebral processes involved in completing an IAT in general
(Ibáñez et al., 2010; Williams and Themanson, 2011; Forbes
et al., 2012). For instance, Forbes et al. (2012) found a large,
early positivity over frontal and occipital regions, and tighter
synchronization between these regions, specifically for blocks
where attitude and response key were congruent. The authors
interpreted this synchronization as reflecting a close match
between brain regions involved in sensory processing and those
involved in executive functions. This, in turn, was interpreted as
support for the notion that the IAT actually measures automatic
associations.
Faking and deception, in general, have been studied using
EEG, most often investigating guilty-knowledge paradigms.
Overall, results have suggested that there is no specific lie
response in ERPs (Johnson et al., 2008). Rather, ERP differences
may strongly reflect the involved cognitive processes. For
example, Hu and Rosenfeld (2012) investigated groups of
participants who were either instructed to commit a mock
crime or not. When presenting “guilty” participants with
rare crime-relevant—compared to frequent crime-irrelevant—
stimuli, these participants showed an increased P300 compared
to an “innocent” control group that was shown rare information
that was autobiographical, but not related to the mock crime.
This is in line with increased P300 amplitudes often found in
oddball experiments for novel stimuli, and for stimuli that are
inconsistent with the established context or inconsistent with
participants’ attitudes (Cacioppo et al., 1993; Ito and Urland,
2003, 2005; Dickter and Bartholow, 2007). However, Hu et al.
(2011) also found a decrease in P300 for deceptive responses in
a design where participants had to make an equal number of
honest and deceptive responses. The same pattern of results was
also found for the later occurring LPP. Crites et al. (2010) found
an increased LPPwhen participants misreported attitudes toward
rare pictures or names, but a decreased LPP when comparing
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deceptive to truthful responses toward frequent pictures or
names (Crites et al., 2010). Thus, a decrease in the P300 and LPP
over central locations is frequently reported when participants
give an equal number of deceptive responses to previously
learned stimuli (Johnson et al., 2003, 2004, 2005). Regarding
deceitful reporting of personal attitudes, participants who were
instructed to lie about their own previously assessed attitudes also
showed a decreased P300/LPP over fronto-central sites, whereas
they showed an increased positivity over occipital regions
(Johnson et al., 2008). It might be that the visual processing of
the faking stimuli seems to have been down-regulated, suggesting
perceptual disengagement from critical target stimuli as one
mechanism of successful faking. Previous research has indicated
that P300 amplitudes decrease as the cognitive resources needed
by a secondary task increase (Johnson, 1986). Thus, in balanced
faking designs, a decrease in the P300/LPP is related to the
amount of monitoring processes needed and cognitive control
required (Johnson et al., 2008).
More recently, even earlier differences are reported when
participants faked responses to self-related vs. non-self-related
information. Previously for the N1 and N2, an increased
negativity was found for faking (Hu et al., 2011). This could
reflect the conflict between the automatic and the response
actually given, as an increased N2 is also found for responses to
incongruent prime-target pairs (Bartholow et al., 2009). In line
with this, increasedN1 andN2were also found when participants
had to inhibit responses in NOGO tasks compared to equally
frequent GO tasks. These differences were linked to enhanced
activity in right inferior frontal regions (Lavric et al., 2004).
In previous deception studies, participants responded either
truthfully or deceitfully to stimuli in yes/no forced-choice
formats. We aimed to apply these findings to reaction-time based
tests. We therefore investigated the cerebral correlates of faking
an attitude test by enabling test takers to alter their responses
in a test where faking is difficult (i.e., when participants are
not informed of how this test can be faked), but whose socially
sensitive content induces participants to do so (e.g., see Wolff
et al., 2015). In line with the experimental paradigm most often
used in social cognition research on IAT faking, participants
were given an explicit faking strategy (see Kim, 2003; Fiedler
and Bluemke, 2005; Cvencek et al., 2010; Roehner et al., 2013).
Response slowing on one’s true attitude is the most commonly
implemented strategy (Verschuere et al., 2009.), although it also
seems possible to cheat on at least some variants of the IAT
via response acceleration (Hu et al., 2012). As response slowing
has been used more often in the literature, and as response
acceleration suffers from the problem that there is a natural lower
limit on reaction times—such that if participants really show
full effort on baseline testing, they may not be able to go much
faster—response slowing was the faking instruction chosen in the
present study.
Participants were required to either respond honestly or to
try faking the doping BIAT using the strategy provided (BIAT;
Brand et al., 2014a). The field of doping attitude testing promises
high ecological validity, with our task being a realistic simulation
of what is likely to happen when athletes undergo respective
psychometric testing. This can serve as a baseline against which
the doping BIAT results obtained from athletes can be compared.
The full sequence of early ERPs was investigated to determine
the onset of faking instruction effects. Using a balanced design
containing an equal number of truthful and deceptive responses,
it was hypothesized that fake responses on the BIAT, similar to
deceptive responses in other contexts, should lead to an increased
occipital positivity (Johnson et al., 2008) and an increased frontal
N1 and N2 (Hu et al., 2011; Hypothesis 1).
Further, a decrease of the P300/LPP over central sites,
which is consistently found for deceptive responses in various
experiments and is interpreted to reflect increased task demands
(Johnson et al., 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008; Crites et al., 2010; Hu
et al., 2011), should be present when participants fake reactions to
the BIAT (Hypothesis 2). Finally, whereas the scalp topography
of the observed differences give rough cues about their possible
cortical origin, EEG source estimation using inverse modeling
can reveal the likely generators more precisely. Specifically, right
prefrontal regions have been implicated in the inhibition of pre-
potent motor responses (Garavan et al., 1999; Bellgrove et al.,
2004; Lavric et al., 2004; Nee et al., 2007; Ye and Zhou, 2009).
Consequently, enhanced activity in right prefrontal regions is
predicted for faking blocks in which an automatic response has
to be inhibited and slowed (Hypothesis 3).
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four students were recruited at the University of
Bielefeld. They gave written informed consent and received
course credit for participation. The study was conducted in
accordance to the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved
by the ethics review board at the University of Bielefeld. One
participant was excluded due to a history of previous mental
disorder, another due to a previous brain tumor, and two
participants due to excessive artifacts, leaving 20 participants for
final analysis. One participant was left-handed.
These 20 participants (15 females) were 24.65 years of age, on
average (SD = 3.50, Min = 20, Max = 30). Screenings with
the German version of the Beck Depression Inventory and the
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1999; Hautzinger
et al., 2009) revealed neither clinically relevant depression (M =
4.25, SD = 3.46) nor anxiety scores (M = 30.00; SD = 3.60).
Design
We used a counterbalanced within-group (repeated measures)
design to test how faking a positive doping attitude (faking
positive, 40 trials), faking a negative doping attitude (faking
negative, 40 trials) or a veridical test (baseline, 40 trials) affected
BIAT scores and EEG signals. As IAT faking has been found to be
virtually impossible when participants complete the test for the
first time (Fiedler and Bluemke, 2005), all participants completed
one practice BIAT first. Then, participants worked on a sequence
of three BIATs. Prior to completing each BIAT, participants
received either the standard instruction (baseline) or were
instructed how to fake a positive (faking positive) or a negative
(faking negative) doping attitude. Counterbalancing of sequences
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(instructions) resulted in six conditions that participants were
randomly assigned to (see Table 1).
The BIAT
Doping attitudes were assessed using a validated picture-based
doping BIAT (Brand et al., 2014a). Our picture-based doping
BIAT used the standard BIAT setup (Sriram and Greenwald,
2009). It required the combined classification of the two concept
categories doping vs. health food, with the classification of the two
attribute categories like vs. dislike. The doping BIAT’s consists of
two combined task blocks. In Block A, stimuli that belong to the
concept doping or the attribute like must be categorized using
the “I” key. In block B, doping stimuli and stimuli belonging to
the attribute category dislike are mapped on the same response
key, and must be categorized using the “I” key. As doping is
consistently mapped on the “I” key, it is the focal concept
because participants have to primarily attend to it (Sriram and
Greenwald, 2009). Upon starting either combined task block,
the complete stimulus set of the categories are shown on two
introductory screens to allow for participants’ familiarization
with the stimuli (doping + like on one, doping + dislike on the
next screen.) The stimuli of the non-focal category health food
were not shown. The task-relevant category labels (doping + like,
or doping + dislike) remain visible at the top and bottom of
the screen so that participants know at any time what stimuli
are focal and have to be categorized using the “I” key. The
picture stimuli representing each category were selected based on
an evaluation of their associative strength with their respective
reference category (Brand et al., 2014a). The doping concept
was represented by pictures of pills, ampoules, and syringes;
the health food concept by apples, cereal, and vegetables; the
like attribute by positive emoticons; and the dislike attribute
by negative emoticons. According to the notation of Sriram
and Greenwald, this setup corresponds to a doping–dislike/like–
(health food) BIAT (2009). The BIAT program file and all stimuli
used are made fully available in Brand et al. (2014a).
Inquisit 3.0 software (www.millisecond.com) was used
to program the BIAT. The practice BIAT consisted of
a discrimination block (20 trials) where participants were
familiarized with the BIAT procedure. Then, the social
expectations compatible block (doping + dislike, 20 trials) was
presented, followed by the incompatible block (doping + like,
20 trials). The order of compatible and incompatible blocks
was counterbalanced between participants to avoid positioning
effects. In the following + trials, the discrimination block
was removed, and compatible and incompatible blocks were
expanded to 40 trials each. Our + is therefore identical to the
one described by Brand et al. (2014a), with the exception that
(a) we expanded to 40 trials to get an adequate number of trials
per cell for ERP averaging, and (b) set the inter-trial interval
to 1000ms in order to avoid introducing artifacts into the EEG
measure. D-scores are calculated according to the D4 algorithm
such that negative scores represent a negative attitude toward
doping (Greenwald et al., 2003). In the D4 algorithm, reaction
times above 10,000ms, and those of error trials, are deleted and
are replaced by an error value (average reaction time of this
participant in all correct trials of the block plus 600ms; mere
elimination of error trials would have a negative impact on the
reliability of the test).
BIAT Faking Instruction
In the faking negative condition, participants were instructed to
fake the subsequent BIAT in a way that would seem like their
attitude was strongly toward anti-doping. In line with previous
deception research, participants were provided with an explicit
faking strategy: For faking a positive attitude, participants were
instructed to slow their responses when doping and dislike shared
the same response key. In the faking negative condition, slowing
of responses in the doping and like condition was described to be
the faking strategy.
EEG Recording
EEG signals were recorded from 128 BioSemi active electrodes
(www.biosemi.com) with a sampling rate of 2048Hz. During
recording, Cz was used as a reference electrode. Biosemi uses
two separate electrodes as ground electrodes: First, a Common
Mode Sense active electrode (CMS), and second, a Driven Right
Leg passive electrode (DLR). Four additional electrodes (EOG)
measured horizontal and vertical eye movement. These were
placed at the outer canthi of the eyes and below the eyes.
Pre-processing and statistical analyses of source activity were
done using SPM8 for EEG (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/).
Although perhaps best known as a toolbox for the analysis of
functional magnetic resonance data, SPM provides a unitary
TABLE 1 | Research design.
t Counterbalanced sequence of experimental BIAT instructions Block discrimination Trials
1 Practice Practice Practice Practice Practice Practice Doping + Likea 20
Doping + Dislike 20
2 Faking Faking Faking Faking Baseline Baseline Doping + Like 40
negative negative positive positive Doping + Dislike 40
3 Faking Baseline Baseline Faking Faking Faking Doping + Like 40
Positive Negative Positive Negative Doping + Dislike 40
4 Baseline Faking Faking Baseline Faking Faking Doping + Like 40
Positive Negative Negative Positive Doping + Dislike 40
aWhether doping + like or doping + dislike was presented as the first block was counterbalanced in order to avoid order effects.
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framework for the analysis of neuroscience data acquired with
different technologies, including EEG and MEG, using the
same rationale (Penny and Henson, 2007; Litvak et al., 2011).
In a first step, data were oﬄine re-referenced to whole-scalp
average reference. That is, for each measured time, the average
voltage across all measured electrodes is subtracted from each
electrode, resulting in non-zero voltage measurements for all 128
electrodes. To identify artifacts caused by saccades (horizontal,
HEOG) or eye blinks (vertical, VEOG), virtual HEOG andVEOG
channels were created from the EOG electrodes. EEG signals
that were highly correlated with HEOG or VEOG activity were
subtracted from the EEG (minimum correlation of 0.5). Data
were then down-sampled to 250Hz, and later band-pass filtered
from 0.166 to 30Hz with a fifth-order Butterworth zero-phase
filter. Filtered data were segmented from 100ms before stimulus
onset until 1000ms after stimulus presentation. 100ms before
stimulus onset were used for baseline correction. Automatic
artifact detection was used to eliminate remaining artifacts
defined as trials exceeding a threshold of 150µV (see e.g., Küper
et al., 2012; Cecchini et al., 2013; Kuipers and Thierry, 2013;
Schindler et al., 2014). Data were then averaged using the robust
averaging algorithm of SPM8, excluding possible further artifacts.
Robust averaging down-weights outliers for each channel and
eachmeasured time, thereby preserving a higher number of trials.
This is because artifacts are not supposed to distort the whole
trial, but most of the time corrupt only parts of the trial. We
used the recommended offset of the weighting function, which
preserves approximately 95% of the data points drawn from a
randomGaussian distribution (Litvak et al., 2011). Overall, 3.12%
of all electrodes were interpolated, and 20.74% of all trials were
rejected. From an initial 40 trials for each block (doping + like
and doping + dislike) within the three conditions (baseline,
faking negative, faking positive), we were able to retain 31.7 trials,
on average. Conditions did not differ with regard to number of
useable trials F(2, 38) = 0.98, p = 0.38, partial η
2 = 0.05, and
there was no interaction between block and condition F(2, 38) =
0.61, p = 0.55, partial η2 = 0.03.
Source reconstructions of the cortical generators of significant
ERP differences were calculated and statistically assessed with
SPM8 for EEG (Friston et al., 2008; Lopez et al., 2013), following
recommended procedures. First, a realistic boundary element
head model (BEM) was derived from SPM’s template head model
based on the standard brain from the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI brain). Electrode positions then were transformed
to match the template head, which is thought to generate
reasonable results even when individual subjects’ head differ from
the template (Litvak et al., 2011). Average electrode positions, as
provided by BioSemi, were co-registered with the cortical mesh
template for source reconstruction. Group inversion (Litvak and
Friston, 2008) was computed and the multiple sparse priors
algorithm implemented in SPM8 was applied. This method
allows activated sources to vary in the degree of activity, but
restricts the activated sources from being the same in all subjects
(Litvak and Friston, 2008). This is thought to result in more
precise source estimation than single-subject matrix inversion.
For source reconstruction, frequency contents between 0.166 and
30Hz were analyzed (Litvak et al., 2011). For each analyzed
time window, three-dimensional source reconstructions were
generated as NIFTI images. These images were smoothed using
an 8mm full-width half-maximum kernel (voxel size = 2mm ×
2mm× 2mm).
BIAT Analyses
In order to test whether faking instructions worked, a repeated-
measures ANOVA (condition: baseline, faking negative, faking
positive) was set-up to investigate main effects for the resulting
D-scores. D-scores are already an aggregate measure of reaction
time differences between the doping + like (positive sign)
and the doping + dislike block (negative sign). For significant
effects (p < 0.05), post-hoc comparisons were computed to
investigate direction of differences. Effect sizes were calculated
for all statistical tests (Cohen, 1988). For significant violations
of Mauchly’s Assumption of Sphericity, degrees of freedom were
corrected according to Greenhouse-Geisser.
EEG Data Analyses
EEG scalp data were analyzed with EMEGS (http://www.emegs.
org/, Peyk et al., 2011). For statistical analyses, 2 (block: doping+
like vs. doping + dislike) × 3 (condition: baseline, faking
negative, faking positive) repeated measures ANOVAs were set-
up to investigate interaction effects between block and condition
in time windows and electrode clusters of interest. We expected
interaction effects because the ERPs for both blocks (doping +
like and doping + dislike) were thought to differ depending on
the given baseline (full effort) or faking instruction (negative vs.
positive). For the faking positive condition, faking was expected
to alter responses in the doping + dislike block, whereas for
faking negative condition, faking was expected to alter responses
in the doping + like block. For significant interaction effects,
post-hoc comparisons were computed between the two blocks to
investigate the direction of mean differences.
After identification of the ERP components, time windows
were segmented from 100 to 130 to investigate occipital P1 and
frontal N1 effects; from 150 to 200ms to investigate occipital N1
and frontal P2 effects; from 200 to 300ms to investigate occipital
P2 and frontal N2 effects; and from 300 to 500ms and 500 to
700ms to investigate P3/LPP effects. For the early time window
(P1-N2), an occipital cluster (twenty-three electrodes: PO5, PO7,
PO9h, PO9, PO3, POO3, O1, OI1, I1, POz, POOz, Oz, OIz,
Iz, PO4, POO4, O2, OI2, I2, PO6, PO8, PO10h, PO10; see e.g.,
Johnson et al., 2008), and also for the N1, P2/N2 time window, a
frontal cluster was examined (twenty-one electrodes: AF7, AFF5,
F3, Fp1, AFp3, AF3, AFF1, F1, Fpz, AFpz, AFz, AFFz, Fz, Fp2,
AFp4, AF4, AFF2, F2, AF8, AFF6, F4; see e.g., Hu et al., 2011). For
the P3/LPP time windows, a centro-parietal cluster was examined
(thirty-four electrodes: FC3, C3, CP3, P3, FC3h, C3h, CP3h, P3h,
FC1, C1, CP1, P1, FCC1h, CCP1h, FCz, Cz, CCPz, CPz, CPPz,
Pz, FCC2h, CCp2h, FC2, C2, CP2, P2, FC4h, C4h, CP4h, P4h,
FC4, C4, CP4, P4; see e.g., Johnson et al., 2005; Crites et al., 2010
and see Figure 1).
Statistical tests for source estimations were calculated for the
same time windows as for the investigated scalp ERPs when
significant scalp effects were found. In order to account for the
noisier estimations in source space, the two faking blocks of both
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FIGURE 1 | Selected electrode clusters for all time windows.
faking conditions were compared to the baseline blocks using a
threshold of p < 0.005 (Campo et al., 2013; Schindler et al., 2015)
with a minimum of 25 significant voxels (Schindler et al., 2015;
Sun et al., 2015). The identification of involved brain regions was
performed using the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002).
Results
Effects of Faking Instruction on BIAT Scores
Mean reaction times for each block in each condition are
displayed in Figure 2. These raw reaction times show a slowing
in the doping + dislike block for the faking positive condition
and in the doping + like block in the faking negative condition.
Participants’ average doping attitudes in the baseline BIAT were
somewhat negative (D-score = −0.26, SD = 0.54) and differed
from zero, t(19) = 2.14, p < 0.05, d = 0.98.
Repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of
condition, F(2, 38) = 123.00, p < 0.001, partial η
2 = 0.87.
Post-hoc comparisons showed that the D score in the faking
positive condition (D-score = 1.27, p < 0.001,d = 2.43)
was significantly larger than the baseline D-score (D-score =
−0.26), which, in turn, was significantly larger than the D-
score in the faking negative condition (D-score = −0.99,
p < 0.001,d = −2.23). This indicates that participants were
successful in behaviorally faking positive and negative doping
attitudes.
EEG Results
In the two faking conditions, participants were instructed to
either respond slower in blocks where like and doping shared
the same key (faking negative), or where dislike and doping
shared the same key (faking positive). Figures 3, 5 show the
post-hoc comparisons within both faking conditions between the
FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction times for each block and condition. Error
bars represent standard deviations.
respective faking and baseline block. Figures 4, 6 show mean
amplitudes in microvolt for all investigated time windows and
sensor clusters. For comparisons between the two baseline blocks,
no significant differences were found in any time window.
Occipital P1 and Frontal N1 (100–130ms). Hypothesis
1 for Early Effects: Increased Frontal Negativity and
Occipital Positivity for Faking
Between 100 and 130ms, no significant interaction between
block (block: doping + like vs. doping + dislike) and condition
(condition: baseline, faking negative, faking positive) was found
for the P1 component over occipital regions [F(2, 38) = 1.92,
p = 0.16, partial η2 = 0.09]. Further, between 100 and 130ms,
there was also no interaction for the frontal N1 [F(2, 38) = 0.50,
p = 0.61, partial η2 = 0.03].
Occipital N1 and Frontal P2 (150–200ms). Hypothesis
1 for Early Effects: Increased Frontal Negativity and
Occipital Positivity for Faking
For the occipital N1, a significant interaction was observed over
occipital [F(2, 38) = 18.32, p < 0.001, partial η
2 = 0.49] regions
between 150 and 200ms. For faking, both the faking block of
the faking negative condition (p < 0.01, d = 0.35) and of the
faking positive condition (p < 0.001,d = 0.51) elicited a reduced
negativity compared to the baseline blocks (see Figures 3, 4). By
contrast, no differences were found between the baseline blocks
(p = 0.79, d = 0.03).
Over frontal sites, a significant interaction was found at the P2
[F(2, 38) = 13.76, p < 0.001, partial η
2 = 0.42; see Figures 3,
4]. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the faking block in the
faking negative condition (p < 0.05, d = 0.35) and the faking
block in the faking positive condition (p < 0.001, d = 0.50)
were less positive-going compared to the baseline blocks in both
faking conditions, leading to a decreased frontal P2. There was no
difference between the two baseline blocks (p = 0.74, d = 0.05).
Occipital P2 and Frontal N2 (200–300ms). Hypothesis
1 for Early Effects: Increased Frontal Negativity and
Occipital Positivity for Faking
Between 200 and 300ms, the interaction effects remained
significant over occipital [F(1.42, 27.06) = 9.41, p < 0.01, partial
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FIGURE 3 | Faking effects on the N1, P2, and N2 components.
(A) Difference topographies within the faking negative and the faking
positive condition: Blue color indicates more negativity and red color
indicates more positivity for the faking blocks (in italics). (B) Selected
electrodes F7, Fz, and F8 for the frontal electrode cluster and PO7,
Oz, and PO8 for the occipital electrode set, displaying the time
course over frontal and occipital sites. Within the faking condition, the
respective blocks where participants were instructed to delay their
responses are represented by straight lines, whereas baseline blocks
are illustrated by dotted lines.
η
2 = 0.33] and frontal regions [F(1.53, 29.06) = 5.73, p < 0.05,
partial η2 = 0.23]. For the occipital cluster, post-hoc comparisons
showed that the faking block of the faking positive condition
(p < 0.01, d = 0.58) elicited a larger positivity compared to the
baseline block, leading to an increased P2, whereas no differences
occurred between baseline blocks (p = 0.31, d = 0.10) and
faking negative blocks (p = 0.15, d = 0.22).
Over frontal sites, the faking block of the faking positive
condition led to an increased N2 compared to the baseline block
(p < 0.01, d = 0.57), but there were neither significant
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FIGURE 4 | Mean amplitudes in microvolt for early effects over frontal and occipital sensor clusters. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean
(SEM).
differences between baseline blocks (p = 0.32, d = 0.13) nor
between the two faking negative blocks (p = 0.31, d = 0.20).
P300 and LPP (300–700ms). Hypothesis 2 for Late
Effects: Decreased Centro-Parietal Positivity for
Faking
Between 300 and 500ms, a significant interaction was found over
centro-parietal sites [F(1.54, 29.32) = 6.84, p < 0.01, partial
η
2 = 0.27; see Figures 5, 6]. For both faking blocks of the
faking negative condition (p < 0.01, d = 0.53) and of the
faking positive condition (p < 0.05, d = 0.32), decreased
P300 components were found compared to the baseline blocks.
No significant differences were observed between baseline blocks
(p = 0.90, d = 0.01).
In the last time window between 500 and 700ms, a
significant interaction was again observed over centro-parietal
sites [F(2, 38) = 11.26, p < 0.001, partial η
2 = 0.37]. Again,
compared to the baseline blocks, decreased amplitudes were
found for both faking blocks of the faking negative condition
(p < 0.001, d = 0.68) and of the faking positive condition
(p < 0.05, d = 0.36), whereas no significant differences were
found between baseline blocks (p = 0.38, d = 0.13).
Source Analyses. Hypothesis 3: Increased
Right-Inferior Frontal Activity for Faking
For time windows where differences in signal space had been
found, source analyses were conducted to examine the differences
in source activity between baseline and faking blocks. Table 2
provides detailed results.
For the first time window between 150 and 200ms, the faking
blocks led to an enhanced activity in the right inferior frontal
gyrus (largest peak [t(1, 78) = 3.00, p < 0.005]), bilaterally
in the middle occipital gyri (largest peak right [t(1, 78) = 4.18,
p < 0.001]), and bilaterally in the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ, largest peak left [t(1, 78) = 3.93, p < 0.001], see
Figure 7). Importantly, there was no significantly large activity
in source space for baseline blocks compared to faking blocks,
even using an extremely liberal threshold (uncorrected p <
0.05).
Between 200 and 300ms, in faking blocks, again, enhanced
activity could be observed in the bilateral TPJ (largest peak
[t(1, 78) = 2.96, p < 0.005]). For the later time windows, no
significant differences were found for any comparison, which
may be partly explained by noisier estimations due to the longer
time windows and by a potentially more complex generator
structure.
Discussion
We experimentally instructed participants to fake positive
doping attitudes or fake negative doping attitudes, or to
respond truthfully to a doping BIAT. Participants were
given a faking strategy and thus could successfully fake
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FIGURE 5 | Faking effects on the P300 and LPP components. (A)
Difference topographies within the faking negative and the faking positive
condition: Blue color indicates more negativity and red color indicates more
positivity for the faking blocks (in italics). (B) Selected electrodes Cz and CPz
for the centro-parietal electrode cluster displaying the time course over
central sites. Within the faking condition, the respective blocks where
participants were instructed to delay their responses are represented by
straight lines, whereas baseline blocks are illustrated by dotted lines.
FIGURE 6 | Mean amplitudes in microvolt for late effects over the centro-parietal sensor cluster. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean (SEM).
doping attitude measurements in both directions. Descriptively,
behavioral (IAT D-scores) and neuroscientific results (EEG
data) suggest that faking a positive doping attitude was more
effortful. This may be due to the already somewhat negative
doping attitude participants exhibited in the baseline condition
(D-score= −0.26).
Investigating the cerebral processing in all conditions, we
found large ERP differences for faking. For the earliest
investigated components—the occipital P1 and frontal N1—
no faking effects were observed, suggesting no differences
between the conditions in initial sensory processing. However,
as expected, a more negative-going potential was observed for
faking, starting at the P2. This negative-going frontal ERP for
faking is in line with previous findings of a larger frontal
N1 and N2 when lying (Hu et al., 2011). Whereas, Hu et al.
(2011) investigated deceptive responses in a yes–no forced choice
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TABLE 2 | Source analyses for each time window.
No. of sig. voxels per cluster Peak t(1, 78) Peak p(unc) MNI space coordinates AAL
x (mm) y (mm) z (mm) Area label
FAKING > BASELINE 150–200ms
431 4.18 <0.001 30 −88 6 Middle occipital R
215 3.93 <0.001 −54 −64 10 Middle temporal L
148 3.80 <0.001 50 −62 14 Middle temporal R
302 3.42 <0.001 −32 −78 10 Middle occipital L
105 3.30 <0.001 −64 −36 0 Middle temporal L
147 3.00 <0.005 42 40 −4 Inferior frontal R
FAKING > BASELINE 200–300ms
45 2.96 <0.005 50 −62 14 Middle temporal R
53 2.92 <0.005 −54 −62 8 Middle temporal L
Comparisons are calculated between baseline and faking blocks (t-contrasts). No. of sig. voxels per cluster, number of significant voxels for each cluster. unc, uncorrected p-value. Each
cluster may exhibit more than one peak, whereas only one peak is displayed. Peak coordinates are displayed in MNI space (x,y, and z). The identification of area labels for each peak
was performed using the AAL atlas. R/L, right or left hemisphere.
FIGURE 7 | Source estimations for the comparison between faking and
baseline blocks for significant scalp effects. In the first time window from
100 to 150ms, more activity in faking blocks were observed in the right inferior
frontal gyrus and bilaterally at the temporoparietal junction and middle occipital
gyri. In the time window between 200 and 300ms, more activity was observed
bilaterally at the temporoparietal junction.
test, we examined reaction times on an attitude measure. In
both cases (choosing the wrong answer or deliberately delaying
responses), participants have to counteract their spontaneous,
possibly automatic response tendency. Interestingly, larger N1
and N2 components can also be found when participants have
to inhibit responses in NOGO tasks (Lavric et al., 2004) or
are presented with incongruent targets, where primes prepared
them for another response (Bartholow et al., 2009). Both the
NOGON2 and the conflict N2 has been subsumed to the control-
related frontal N2 (Folstein and Van Petten, 2008). We infer
from this that the increased frontal negativity could reflect the
conflict between such an automatic response tendency and the
deliberately given response. This frontal negativity seems to be
influenced not only by the faking instruction, but also by the
direction of the faking instruction. The presented stimuli and the
faking strategy were identical for the faking negative and faking
positive doping attitude conditions. Still, a larger N2 for faking
was only observed within the faking positive condition, where
the conflict between an automatic and a given response might
have been more difficult to resolve. This could have been more
demanding because it deviated more from the mildly negative
doping attitudes of our participants.
Over occipital locations, a reduced negativity for the N1
and a larger positivity at the P2 was found while faking.
An increased positivity over occipital sensors is also reported
for deceptive responses toward previously assessed attitudes
(Johnson et al., 2008). This reduced negativity at occipital
sensors could reflect an alteration of visual information
processing at secondary processing stages. Whereas, the P1
response was unaffected by the instruction, starting with
the N1 visual processing of the target stimuli seems to
have been down-regulated compared to baseline, suggesting
perceptual disengagement from critical target stimuli as one
mechanism of successful faking. Attention research often
has shown increased N1 components for attended stimuli
(Hillyard et al., 1998). These have been suggested to originate
mainly in the secondary visual cortex (e.g., Hopf et al.,
2002).
Later, starting with the P300 time window, less positive-going
ERPs could be observed at central sites during both faking blocks.
This is in accordance with the frequently reported decreased
P300/LPP amplitudes for deceptive responses to previously
shown stimuli or previously assessed attitudes (Johnson et al.,
2003, 2004, 2008; Crites et al., 2010). In these studies, participants
were instructed to choose the wrong response option while
faking. Although there may be no specific lie response in ERPs
(Johnson et al., 2008), current results suggest that there are
striking similarities in the underlying processes when comparing
these previous results with current findings from an experiment
where participants were required to only alter their response
speed.
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Further, source analyses revealed that deception led to a
larger activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus and, although
not specifically hypothesized, bilaterally in the temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) and the bilateral middle occipital gyri at earlier
measured times. Previous research has shown that the right
inferior frontal gyrus is important for the processing of attitudes
(Wood et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2011), but also for memory
inhibition (Wimber et al., 2008) and inhibition of automatic
responses (Garavan et al., 1999; Bellgrove et al., 2004; Nee et al.,
2007; Ye and Zhou, 2009). Thus, the enhanced activity in faking
blocks appears to reflect the inhibition of the automatic response
to the presented stimulus. This inhibitionmight closely be related
to response inhibition, for example, for memory inhibition, an
increased late positivity over right frontal regions has been found
(Hanslmayr et al., 2009). This response-related inhibition is
further supported by similar source estimation results from an
experiment using equally frequent GO and NOGO trials (Lavric
et al., 2004). For NOGO trials where participants had to inhibit
a response, larger source activity was found in right prefrontal
areas in the N2 time window (220–320; Lavric et al., 2004). In
this time window, response inhibition and conflict monitoring
are discussed in the ERP literature (Lavric et al., 2004; Folstein
and Van Petten, 2008; Bartholow et al., 2009). The combination
of findings in scalp and source space therefore suggests an
inhibitory account. We suppose that participants indeed had
difficulties to overcome their pre-potent motor response when
delaying their responses. Moreover, this initial right IFG activity
may initialize the monitoring process that leads to reduced P3
and LPP components.
Also, while faking, participants showed more activity in the
TPJ between 150 and 300ms. Interestingly, this region has been
previously shown to be more active when participants fake
responses (Ganis et al., 2011). But as this region is also relevant
for attention (Pessoa et al., 2009) and intentional actions (Saxe
et al., 2004; den Ouden et al., 2005), its enhanced activity could
also reflect the monitoring of the planned response, namely, to
inhibit the automatic response toward the target stimulus.
Summarizing the results, subsequent deception can already
be observed, starting with the frontal P2 and occipital N1,
extending into the frontal N2 and occipital P2 and the centro-
parietal P300/LPP. One could argue that the slowing of responses
simply reduced ERP amplitudes throughout all time windows.
However, the pattern of results in scalp and source space for the
early components seem to be very similar to response inhibition
findings (Lavric et al., 2004), whereas slower response behavior
in the absence of inhibition requirements has been found to
affect mostly the P300 (Wascher et al., 1996). In support of this
argument, the frontal N2 and the occipital P2 are significantly
larger in the critical condition of the fake positive block, which
can be assumed to induce more of a response conflict and
more inhibitory requirements than the fake negative block, which
effectively only requires accentuation of the actual response
tendency. By contrast, faking negative and faking positive does
not differ on the parietal P3 and LPP components. Further, the
enhanced source activity for the faking blocks in the TPJ and
right inferior frontal gyrus suggests that even when a strategy is
supplied, faking is likely an active cognitive process. The right
inferior frontal gyrus activity may be responsible for suppressing
an automatic response tendency.
So far, it is not clear whether the present results are specific
to the BIAT or extend to other variants of the IAT, or in how
far they also apply to slowing in reaction time-based tasks in
general. ERP similarities between our results and those from
other studies using forced-choice formats could support the
hypothesis that our results are not BIAT specific. However,
in light of frameworks that distinguish between automatic
(implicit) and deliberate (explicit) attitudes (i.e., dual-process
models of social cognition; Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Gawronski
and Bodenhausen, 2006), our findings nevertheless suggest that
conflicts between deliberate and automatic processes occur
during faking, and that they may occur very early in the
processing stream. Still, it is important to note that such early
effects, as described by Hu et al. (2011) and in the present
study, may be partly due to experimental design. The blocked
designs used in these studies enable participants to anticipate and
prepare deceptive responses across an entire block, which may
have induced earlier ERP effects.
In sum, this is the first study to examine the neural
correlates of faking the BIAT. It revealed that deception
already modulates very early brain responses, and suggests
the right inferior frontal gyrus to be a crucial brain region
for suppressing automatic responses in the deception context.
Further, source estimations suggest that the TPJ may be involved
in the monitoring of executed responses and also of suppressed
responses. Alternatively, these results show that IATs can be
faked (in line with e.g., Kim, 2003), challenging the theoretical
claim that IAT scores really reflect implicit associations. These
are theorized to represent output from the impulsive system and
should be immune to faking (De Houwer et al., 2009). From a
practical perspective, test-takers with high motivation to disguise
their true attitude will most likely begin to develop and apply
deception strategies. Faking on socially sensitive topics (such as
doping in sports) is therefore likely to occur for people who
have a high intrinsic motivation to deceive on this topic (such
as professional athletes). Knowledge of the cerebral processes that
accompany deceptive efforts might be utilized in order to prevent
or detect faking attempts in the future.
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